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Between National and Human Security: 
Energy Security in the United States and Western 
Europe in the 1970s 
Rüdiger Graf  
Abstract: »Zwischen Sicherheit und Human Security: Energiesicherheit in den 
USA und Westeuropa in den 1970er Jahren«. The article examines, on the one 
hand, the changes to the concept of energy security in the second half of the 
twentieth century, particularly in the 1970s, and on the other hand, the influ-
ence of these conceptual changes on the overall change to the perception and 
architecture of “security”. It argues that the concept of “energy security” lost 
its close connection to state and military security while being extended with 
respect to its spatial scope, reference object, issues, and classification of dan-
gers. This extended the notion of energy security and, in turn, exerted a crucial 
influence on the overall extension of the security debates from state to human 
security via the Brandt, Palme and Brundtland Commissions, which tried to 
address global security issues. Thus, in the 1970s our current energy and secu-
rity constellation emerged, partially superseding the logic of the Cold War. 
Keywords: energy, energy security, security, USA, 1970s, oil crisis, oil em-
bargo, United Nations, Brandt Commission. 
1. Human Security and Energy Security –  
Concepts and Historical Analysis 
Since the publication of the Human Development Report in 1994 the concept 
of human security has undergone an impressive career. Today, many texts 
celebrate the term as setting a new political agenda in the post-Cold War world, 
but almost as many bemoan its vagueness that allegedly precludes both thor-
ough political analysis and concrete policy-making.1 Despite major disagree-
ments over the contents and usability of the term, there is a consensus at least 
about a core meaning of human security. The term extends classical notions of 
security that dominated in the 20th century or even, as some argue, since the 
creation of the so called Westphalian System. These older conceptions of secu-
rity considered the state to be the primary subject and object of security.2 In 
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contrast or rather in addition to state security, human security focuses on indi-
vidual human beings and attempts to guarantee and expand their vital free-
doms, encompassing freedom from fear and freedom from want.3 Therefore, 
human security also concerns new types of threats that were not at the center of 
state security, such as economic risks or environmental hazards. Moreover, it 
expands the number of possible conveyors of security from states to interna-
tional and non-governmental organizations.  
In general, ‘human security’ is mostly used in order to describe the security 
of the basic core of people’s livelihoods which may be threatened by civil wars, 
natural disasters, or failing states. Because of its empowering dimension, how-
ever, it is far from clear where the scope of human security ends. As Roland 
Paris enumerates, depending on the context, human security may refer to: 
(1) economic security (e.g. freedom from poverty); (2) food security (e.g. ac-
cess to food); (3) health security (e.g. access to health care and protection 
from diseases); (4) environmental security (e.g. protection from such dangers 
as environmental pollution and depletion); (5) personal security (e.g. physical 
safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, 
drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); (6) community security (e.g. 
survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical secu-
rity of these groups); and (7) political security (e.g. enjoyment of civil and po-
litical rights, and freedom from political oppression).4 
Today, the extensive use of energy and especially the burning of fossil fuels 
are essential to several of the above-mentioned dimensions: Economic security 
depends on the access to sufficient energy resources and, above all, on the 
continuous flow of oil; food security has largely been achieved by the use of 
artificial fertilizers which are based on hydrocarbons; environmental security is 
threatened by the extensive burning of coal and oil, and even political and thus 
personal and community security are endangered by military conflicts which 
are fought over the access to natural resources. However, the concept of energy 
is conspicuously absent from both the 2003 Human Security Now Report and 
the 2004 Human Security Doctrine for Europe.5 The former only vaguely ac-
knowledges the necessity of securing everybody’s access to sufficient natural 
resources and sees this access – particularly in the case of water – as a potential 
source of conflict. The latter even argues that, while older conceptions of secu-
rity had focused on strategic assets such as oil, today human security concen-
trates on “five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organised crime”.6 En-
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ergy and oil, however, do not seem to be related to Europe’s major security 
questions.  
Because of this discrepancy, I will examine the relationship between energy 
and security in Western Europe and the United States since the Second World 
War in greater detail. This analysis is complicated by the changes to “energy” 
and “security” on both a conceptual and a factual level in the period under 
scrutiny. On the one hand, the global economy of oil and energy and its con-
ceptualization underwent fundamental changes in the second half of the twenti-
eth century which accelerated significantly in the 1970s as a consequence of 
the oil embargo and the oil price increases. On the other hand, security regimes 
changed and, as Emma Rothschild or Christopher Daase have shown, the con-
cept of security was extended from a narrow understanding of state to the 
broader idea of human security.7 In Christopher Daase’s analysis the widening 
took place in four different dimensions: with respect to the spatial scope, the 
reference object, the issue area, and the classification of dangers.8 
Owing to these conceptual changes, my questions point in two directions: 
On the one hand, I will ask how energy supply and demand were situated 
within the context of the changing debates on security in Western Europe and 
the United States: When, how and why was energy supply perceived as a mat-
ter of state and military security? When was it related to broader concepts of 
security and when was it even considered to be an element of human security? 
On the other hand, I will ask if and how the rising importance and politicization 
of energy and especially oil in the 1970s influenced the conceptual change 
within the discourses about security: Did the emergence of “energy security” as 
a central political category influence more general conceptions of security and 
the discursive change from national to human security? 
While the first set of questions uses “national” and “human security” as ana-
lytical concepts in order to examine the changing perceptions of energy and 
energy security, the second set tries to elaborate the influence of changing 
energy regimes on the conceptual change from national to human security. The 
simultaneous use of terms as both analytical and source concepts poses severe 
problems for historical analysis. In attempting to write a theoretically informed 
contemporary history, however, it is hardly possible to avoid using terms of the 
neighboring disciplines while at the same time historicizing them. So far, his-
torical theory has not addressed the problems arising from this constellation for 
contemporary history in a satisfying way. While this article is not the place to 
develop a theoretical account of how to deal with concepts from neighboring 
disciplines, it still tries to explore how it might be done.  
Moreover, it deals with a crucial period in the history of Western security 
systems in which détente led to an easing of East-West tensions while simulta-
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neously new threats arose. With the emergence of energy security as a central 
concern of political decision-making on all levels, the logic of the Cold War 
that had prevailed since 1945 seemed to be in question and was even partially 
superseded. New lines of confrontation between the First and the Third World 
or rather the producers and consumers of raw materials emerged which, for 
many observers, foreshadowed a new world order. As both energy systems and 
security architectures were globalized, their transformation in the 1970s 
changed the perception of the world and one’s own position within it, anticipat-
ing the post-Cold War debates of the 1990s. Hence, focusing on “energy” and 
“security,” the 1970s appear as a crucial transformative period in the history of 
Western industrial countries, heralding the beginning of our time. 
2. Energy – from National and Military to International 
and Economic Security 
In the First World War, oil emerged as the essential resource for the successful 
conduct of warfare. From then on national security, understood as military 
security of a nation state, depended on the availability of sufficient amounts of 
oil in order to fuel warships, planes, tanks, and other military vehicles.9 The 
importance of oil as a strategic resource became even more apparent in the 
Second World War when it propelled Germany’s Blitzkrieg, motivated the 
Japanese decision to attack the USA, and was decisively lacking after the fail-
ure of the German armies to capture the oil fields in the Caucasus.10 In the 
course and the aftermaths of the wars, and especially after the Second World 
War, the United States and its allies placed access to sufficient oil reserves at 
the center of their national interests.11 In the postwar world these oil reserves 
were increasingly found in the Middle East, which became a highly contested 
region. The importance of oil for the security strategies of the Western alliance 
became particularly clear every time its continuous flow was endangered, as for 
example after the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, in the Suez 
Crisis in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967 or the oil crises in 1973/74 and 
1978/79. 
Over the course of the three postwar decades from 1945 to the mid-1970s, 
the structures of the global economy of oil and, accordingly, the conditions of 
the relation between oil/energy and security changed fundamentally. This was, 
above all, owing to the sharp rise in demand in Western industrialized coun-
tries. The postwar economic boom required growing energy supplies which 
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were increasingly met by oil, substituting coal as the primary source of en-
ergy.12 Apart from mass motorization and residential heating, more and more 
parts of the economy became dependent on the continuous flow of oil, while 
the oil industry presented itself as the basis not only of economic growth but 
also of modern civilization and its social and political stability. As Halliburton 
asserted in an advertisement in 1959, oil was the “energy for civilization”:  
The needs of civilized man have increased throughout the ages based on de-
sires of increasing populations to live better. Oil and its energy making com-
ponents have been and will continue to be part of this progressive program of 
civilisation which guarantees function and preservation of this ideology. On 
this theme the future of democracy will forever depend. Halliburton’s exten-
sive research and development programs are devoted to this progressing civi-
lization ... through scientific application of Halliburton services and tech-
niques, our tomorrows will be better ... because of oil.13 
The growing dependence of Western industrial nations on oil and especially 
oil imports from the Middle East did not necessarily pose a problem for their 
national security. Energy experts carefully distinguished between “depend-
ence” and “vulnerability”. As long as the United States remained the world’s 
largest producer of crude oil and had a significant surplus production capacity 
at its disposal, energy imports did not produce national security risks. In fact, 
advocates of oil imports argued that foreign oil would enhance US national 
security as it would spare oil reserves at home.14 As late as during the Six Day 
War in 1967, the United States could counter an embargo attempt by OPEC 
countries by simply augmenting its own production. Owing to increasing do-
mestic demand, however, this possibility ceased to exist soon afterwards and 
the security of oil supplies and especially the possibility of intentional oil sup-
ply interruptions became a matter of great concern to the governments of West-
ern industrialized countries.15 
How far did these developments influence or change the conception of en-
ergy security in itself? Traditionally, energy and particularly oil security had 
been linked to a conception of national security that was largely understood in 
military terms. According to this narrow conception, national security was 
guaranteed as long as the state was able to provide sufficient oil supplies for its 
armies in order to defend itself. In 1971 the independent analyst and former 
member of the Army Nuclear Power Program with the US Atomic Energy 
Commission, Carl Vansant, produced a late and, at the time of publication, 
almost anachronistic expression of this view analyzing the “strategic energy 
supply and national security”. Vansant argued that energy sources were “fun-
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damental to a nation’s strength” and that they had to be secured, above all, by 
military and political means.16 But even Vansant acknowledged that there was 
more to energy security than its military dimension: 
From a military point of view, it is important that the energy supplies for mili-
tary forces be designed for, and maintained in, a secure posture. It is even mo-
re important, however, that national systems for energy supply be built on se-
cure foundations of political, technical, and economic policy; for, in fact, it is 
the civil structure of energy systems that underlies and braces strategic secu-
rity.17 
In general, energy experts as well as experts of national security acknowl-
edged the rising importance of oil for the functioning of industrialized econo-
mies in the postwar world and, therefore, broadened the concept of energy 
security, which was essential not only to the conduct of modern warfare but to 
the vital functions of economy and society as a whole. This conceptual change 
was to a large extent induced by political actors, national governments, and 
international organizations. Still bearing in mind the Suez crisis and facing 
threats to a continuous flow of oil throughout the 1960s, the countries organ-
ized in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
tried to coordinate their oil and energy policies in order to achieve security 
against interruptions of supply. In May 1960 the Council of the OECD recom-
mended that its member countries should “prepare, in advance, plans that will 
enable them to introduce prompt and effective reductions in consumption of 
petroleum products if an oil supply emergency should occur”.18 In order to 
review the degree to which these plans had been developed and implemented, 
the OECD Special Committee for Oil sent detailed questionnaires to the gov-
ernments and in turn distributed the results of these surveys to all member 
countries in 1963, 1966, 1970, and 1972.19 In the member countries these ques-
tionnaires raised attention to oil and energy issues and induced national activi-
ties in these fields. The efforts mainly aimed at politically motivated short term 
supply interruptions and were intended to guarantee the ability of the states to 
sustain their vital functions and military capabilities. However, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s the relevant ministries in most Western industrialized 
countries started to develop plans to restructure their energy sectors in order to 
secure the continuous availability of sufficient energy sources at low prices, 
which indicates a diversion from the close connection between energy and 
military security.  
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In this process the concept of energy security was broadened in exactly 
those dimensions that Rothschild and Daase observed for the overall develop-
ment of the concept of security: Energy and especially oil supply security was 
not only related to military ability and strength but also to economic develop-
ment as a whole and, thus, the issue area of energy security was widened. It 
was fundamental for economic, but also for political stability, as the legitimacy 
of Western democracies depended on delivering a high standard of living and 
sufficient consumer goods. Accordingly, energy security concerned not only 
the well-being of the state but also of individual human beings in the industrial-
ized countries, i.e. the reference group was significantly extended. As the oil 
economy was a global system and Western industrialized countries became 
increasingly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, threats to energy 
security ceased to be domestic and regional – they became increasingly global-
ized and therefore the geographical scope of energy security widened. Among 
the central and most disturbing experiences of the oil crises in the Western 
world in the 1970s was the perception that the decisions and actions of rulers in 
remote regions of the world who seemed to be irrational and hard to control 
had an almost immediate effect on the everyday life of the people in Western 
Europe, Japan, and the USA. Moreover, categorization of dangers moved from 
direct threats to discussions of vulnerability and risk. Finally, for various rea-
sons states had only limited capacities to influence the flow of oil and to secure 
their own supplies. Thus, several looked for internationally coordinated strate-
gies, for example within NATO, the European Community or the OECD, in 
order to achieve energy security. Accordingly, the number of possible provid-
ers of energy security increased as well. 
This tendency towards the widening of the concept of energy security and 
the loosening of its connection with military and national security became 
apparent in the workings of the United States National Security Council in the 
early 1970s. In order to assess the consequences of the changes in the global 
economy of oil for the national security of the United States, the Security 
Council issued two National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) that influ-
enced US strategy and decision-making in the field of energy throughout the 
so-called first oil crisis: NSSM 114 on the “World Oil Situation” was produced 
in 1971 and NSSM 174 on “National Security and US Energy Policy” was 
composed in the spring and summer of 1973.20 NSSM 114’s aim was to answer 
the question of how the changing world oil situation – that is the increasing 
prices due to OPEC and the producing countries’ demands of sovereignty over 
their mineral resources – affected “US security, political, and economic inter-
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ests”.21 It distinguished between two different positions: On the one hand, 
experts judged that the growing dependence on oil from the Middle East posed 
a severe security risk for the USA and NATO. While the oil import control and 
domestic resources put the USA in a comparatively good position, NATO 
partners only had petroleum inventories for about three months which would be 
used up much faster in the case of East-West tensions. This might cause serious 
problems, but the Department of Defense did not believe that “US military 
operations in Southeast Asis [sic] would be seriously endangered by an oil 
crisis – in the event of a Libyan or Persian Gulf shutdown.” On the other hand, 
experts thought that even these fears were exaggerated because politically 
motivated interruptions of supply were very unlikely, as the producing coun-
tries were primarily concerned about prices and most of them could not afford 
supply interruptions.22 
Two years later, NSSM 174 was commissioned by Henry A. Kissinger as a 
“study of the national security implications of world energy supply and distri-
bution” in order to “define and discuss the national security aspects of the 
prospected situation and propose alternative policies”. Compared to NSSM 114 
it expressed a greater sense of urgency concerning the security of oil supplies 
while at the same time diminishing the military aspect of the problem. Project-
ing energy supply and demand up to 1985, it judged that the USA would “be-
come increasingly vulnerable” to oil supply disruptions that might be caused by 
three factors: a non-nuclear war, a war in the Middle East or a politically moti-
vated embargo. In all cases military security was the smallest problem. Experts 
argued that the Department of Defense’s “needs for oil would be greatest in a 
general non-nuclear war involving NATO. However, these needs would be 
only about 10 percent of US domestic production and could be met, on a prior-
ity basis, solely from our domestic production.” Rather, they suggested that the 
“major effect of a supply cut-off on our military capabilities would likely be 
indirect: the adverse effect on our economy as a whole and the pressure which 
cutoffs would create for diversion of military oil supplies to civilian use.”23 
Because of the different degrees of dependence on oil from the Middle East, 
the oil question might also cause frictions within the Western alliance and thus 
weaken its security structure. All in all, NSSM 174 concluded that “the energy 
question does not stand in isolation from our major monetary, trade, environ-
mental and national security issues facing this country. It is intrinsically related 
to these issues.”24 
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In October 1973 the Organization of Arab Petrol Exporting Countries an-
nounced overall oil production cuts and a full embargo against the United 
States and the Netherlands in order to pressure Western governments to assume 
a pro-Arab stance in the conflict with Israel, which had again become violent in 
the Yom Kippur War. Supported by oil price increases unilaterally imple-
mented by OPEC as a whole, the so-called first oil crisis confirmed expecta-
tions of the possibility of an intentional supply interruption. However, even in 
the European countries and Japan, which were much more dependent on oil 
from North Africa and the Middle East, the oil crisis had consequences not for 
military but for economic, social and, thus, political security. Already in prepa-
ration for oil supply emergencies, the British Central Policy Review Staff and 
an interdepartmental group of officials headed by the Department of Trade and 
Industry developed strategies to secure energy supplies not because of the 
expected military but because of the general economic effects of an oil short-
age.25 When the oil crisis coincided with a miners’ strike at the end of 1973, the 
conservative Heath government introduced a state of emergency and an-
nounced a three-day working week. Even the gloomy Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee Report of December 5, however, did not see Britain’s or NATO’s mili-
tary capabilities endangered. Yet it argued that a prolonged embargo might lead 
to international tensions, military conflict and even superpower confrontation. 
Thus, it suggested that an oil shortage might have severe consequences for 
Britain’s national security, but also for the (as we might say human) security of 
people around the globe.26 As in Great Britain, neither the state planning com-
mission in France nor the Expert Council on the Assessment of Economic 
Development (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung) in Germany saw the oil embargo and the oil price hikes as 
threats to national security and military capabilities.27 However, they diagnosed 
significant consequences for economic and social development and suggested 
alternative energy strategies.  
The only constellation in which the oil crisis seemed to endanger military 
capabilities occurred at the beginning of November 1973 when the Saudi Ara-
bian government imposed a secondary embargo on those countries from which 
the American fleet, which was distributed around the globe, obtained its oil.28 
Noting that the oil embargo’s effect on the United States was not severe 
enough, the Saudi Arabian government had requested that Aramco obtain the 
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relevant data for a secondary embargo from its mother companies in the US: 
Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and Standard Oil. Despite the fact the American fleet 
was on strategic alert because of the seemingly impending superpower confron-
tation in the Middle East in the course of the Yom Kippur War, executives of 
the multinational corporations complied without hesitation to Aramco’s de-
mands and supplied Saudi Arabia with the data. In the ensuing hearings in front 
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the Democratic Senator 
Henry A. Jackson asked: 
Didn’t anyone say ‘Look, boys, we are in the midst of a strategic alert. 
Shouldn’t the Secretary of Defense, the highest people in the government, be 
advised of the October 31 wire and what do we do about it?’ Wouldn’t that be 
the thing an ordinary stiff would understand?29 
As it appears, none of the executives had had this idea; instead they called 
the Pentagon only shortly before the end of the deadline set by the Saudi Ara-
bian government in order to make sure that they could not be sued for giving 
out the data.  
Even this incident, however, did not cause a serious impediment to US mili-
tary security. However, the oil embargo and the oil price hikes as a whole 
changed the perception of energy security. Even though energy security had 
been an important concern of OECD governments throughout the 1960s, in 
most countries it was only the energy crisis of the early 1970s that established 
it as central field of political activity. The awareness of energy as a basis of 
economic and political life rose as experts constantly talked about it in the 
media and the highest government officials received weekly, and at times even 
daily, reports on the energy supply situation in their countries. Experiencing or 
rather expecting a lack of oil supplies, governments restructured and central-
ized energy competences and some sought international cooperation in the field 
of energy, which led to the Washington Energy Conference in 1974 and to the 
establishment of the International Energy Agency. However, energy security 
did not become a central concern because oil was needed for military purposes, 
but because it was closely connected to economic development and the well-
being of the people. Contemporary fears concerning the possible consequences 
of supply disruptions for the economy and the people in Western industrialized 
countries were magnified as the oil crisis coincided with general worries about 
the exhaustibility of mineral resources. Criticizing American-style consumer-
ism and arguing that the German economic growth rates in the 1960s had de-
pended on the unlimited availability of cheap oil, the German weekly magazine 
Der Spiegel, for example, declared that the oil crisis heralded the coming end 
of “affluent societies” and of the age of abundance in the West and painted the 
future in dark colors.30 
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Reading drastic depictions like these, the discourse on energy security in the 
1970s appears almost as a discourse on human security avant la lettre. Of 
course, in the industrialized countries energy supply interruptions did not pose 
such severe limitations to people’s vital freedoms as wars or ecological disas-
ters, which are commonly associated with the concept of human security. Yet, 
“security” and especially its emotional components are relative to the achieved 
living standard and, therefore, threats to embargo Europe and to wreck its 
economies could engender significant fears concerning the security of the peo-
ple in Western industrialized societies.31 Moreover, less-developed countries 
were hit much harder than industrialized countries that could afford higher 
prices more easily, and the plight of the people in these countries for whom a 
lack of oil could indeed affect very basic freedoms was discussed intensively as 
consuming countries used them as an argument against OPEC.32 Finally, as the 
above-mentioned British Joint Intelligence Report argued, the structure of 
energy regimes had severe implications for the security of the international 
system. Particularly advocates of alternative energy paths, such as Amory 
Lovins, suggested that the current, highly centralized energy systems that relied 
heavily on fossil fuels would foster undemocratic political structures and desta-
bilize the international order, thus affecting conditions we deem essential for 
human security worldwide.33 
3. The Energy Crises of the 1970s and the 
Changing Perceptions of Security  
As I have shown so far, due to increasing oil consumption, the notion of energy 
security changed over the course of the postwar decades and especially in the 
1970s. While it had been closely connected with conceptions of military capa-
bility and national security, it gradually widened and encompassed economic, 
social, and political security. In certain respects the discussions on energy 
security even resembled later debates on human security. Thus, I will now 
continue to scrutinize whether the widespread discussions on energy in the 
1970s, and especially the broadened notion of energy security, influenced the 
widening of the overall discourse on security: Did energy security contribute to 
the conceptual change from state and military to human security?  
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Most authors consider the emergence of “human security” and the widening 
of the security concept as a product of the post-Cold War era when the confron-
tation between the United States and the Soviet Union lost its dominant posi-
tion, but its beginnings can be located earlier. While Emma Rothschild traces 
ideas of human security back to the Enlightenment, she depicts the 1970s as a 
formative period for contemporary conceptions of human security.34 In the 
same vein, Christopher Daase argues that the awareness of threats to national 
security other than military attacks rose in response to the economic crises in 
the 1970s and that, therefore, the contents of the concept of national security 
widened.35 Indeed, in the 1970s economic stability and growth became essen-
tial elements of national security concerns; in the opinion of the democratic 
Senator and later US Vice President Walter F. Mondale “the risk that the opera-
tion of the international economy may spin out of control” even overshadowed 
the dangers arising from nuclear armaments and superpower confrontation.36 
For this change in the perception of threats as well as the feelings of insecurity, 
the Arab oil embargo and OPEC’s oil price increases of 1973/74 were crucial. 
As the American President Richard Nixon put it when addressing the Washing-
ton Energy Conference of non-communist oil-consuming countries in February 
1974, for Western politicians it had become evident that “security and eco-
nomic considerations are inevitably linked, and energy cannot be separated 
from either”.37 In a similar way, the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt ar-
gued in front of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 
1977 that the economy was first among the “new dimensions of security”. 
Schmidt continued that if there was one single most important question for the 
economic security of the West, it was the energy question for which, in turn, oil 
was essential.38 This assessment was shared throughout the political spectrum. 
As the Christian Democrat Manfred Wörner had already declared at the Mu-
nich Security Conference in 1975, NATO was not autarchic any more in pro-
viding security to its member states. Following Karl Kaiser, Wörner held the 
view that, while NATO could span a nuclear umbrella to shelter its members, it 
could not offer an umbrella of raw materials.39 For both Schmidt and Wörner, 
the oil embargo of 1973 had been the event that sparked this insight and, there-
fore, Wörner even called it a “fundamental watershed” and the “key event of 
the Western world in the second half of the 20th century”.40 
This appreciation was shared and to a large extent produced by political sci-
entists and foreign policy experts, who wrote in the aftermath of the embargo 
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and the oil price hikes and constructed them as a turning point in world his-
tory.41 Reviewing the contemporary literature on energy security and foreign 
policy for the newly founded journal International Security, Linda B. Miller 
argued that since 1973 the close connection between energy and security as 
well as the impossibility of guaranteeing national security by military means 
alone had been obvious to everybody.42 According to Miller, the oil crisis and 
its aftermath from 1973 to 1975 had already become a new paradigm case for 
the study of world politics. This paradigm suggested that state-centered views 
were insufficient because the complex interactions in the fields of energy and 
other resources involved a multitude of non-state actors.43 In the same vein, 
Joseph S. Nye discussed the prospects of collective security in 1974 and argued 
that it was insufficient to treat it as a military question but rather that one also 
had to integrate economic stability. As economic security was a matter of de-
gree, Nye suggested that it could be severely endangered by resource supply 
disruptions and advocated international structures on a mutually beneficial 
basis for producing and consuming countries.44 In the discourse on oil/energy 
and national security after the first oil crisis, only a few authors still concen-
trated on the military aspects of the question, such as Bo Heinebaeck.45 Apart 
from the geopolitics of scarce resources and their importance for economic 
development, authors dealing with “energy” and “security” also discussed 
nuclear proliferation, military preparedness, the possibility and risk of a mili-
tary confrontation at the Persian Gulf and the consequences of energy policies 
for conflict behavior.46 
At the beginning of the 1980s, however, the economically widened notion of 
security, and the essential importance of energy and particularly oil in this 
context, had been firmly established as the majority view.47 Thus, Philip 
Odeen, who had been a staff member of the National Security Council during 
the preparation of NSSM 174, preached to the already converted when he ar-
gued that the essential connection between energy and national security had 
been neglected too long and that energy had to be put at the center of US na-
tional security concerns.48 This had become the official US strategy at least 
with the announcement of the Carter Doctrine, according to which the United 
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States understood any attempt to change the power structure around the Persian 
Gulf as an attack on its vital national security interests.49 The Carter Doctrine 
points at another dimension in which energy and security became linked and 
which also contributed to an extension of the security concept: Energy and 
security were not only closely connected because supply interruptions endan-
gered the economic, social, and political security of the people in the consum-
ing countries, but also because the fear of supply interruptions might engender 
military conflicts or resource wars. As Richard H. Ullmann observed in 1983, 
“‘resource wars’ (as some call them) [had] figured prominently in the dooms-
day literature for more than a decade”.50 This understanding that the heavy 
reliance on fossil fuels and particularly oil posed a primary international secu-
rity risk can still be found today in both scholarly treatises and the popular 
media.51 
Another influence of oil and energy on the broadening of the security con-
cept was exerted via the debates on international development and on the estab-
lishment of a fairer economic world order. Since the late 1960s and throughout 
the 1970s there had been intensive discussions among the developing countries 
to take OPEC and the oil embargo as an example and turn other natural re-
sources into strategic assets in order to achieve more favorable terms of trade 
or even a New International Economic Order.52 These claims of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources voiced by so-called Third World countries 
raised significant fears in the Western world53 and led to the establishment of 
various commissions and discussion groups in order to avoid confrontation, 
such as the Euro-Arab dialogue. These groups aimed at the establishment of 
more secure living conditions in both the developing and the developed coun-
tries. At the level of the UN or at least inspired by the UN, several commis-
sions dealt with global security issues and constituted important precursors of 
the 1990s debates on “Human Security” within the United Nations Develop-
ment Program: From 1977 to 1980 the “Independent Commission on Interna-
tional Development Issues” (the so-called Brandt Commission) produced the 
report North-South – A Programme for Survival; two years later the “Inde-
pendent Commission on Disarmament and Security” (Palme Commission) 
published Common Security, and from 1984 to 1987 the “World Commission 
on Environment and Development” (Brundtland Commission) worked on the 
report Our Common Future.54 
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Named after the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who had headed the 
commission, the Palme Report dealt mostly with questions of military security 
and – particularly nuclear – disarmament. Characteristically, it turned the al-
ready established connection between national and economic security around, 
suggesting that a common security structure between the East and the West 
would reduce the costs of military armaments and thus free financial capacities 
for achieving social and economic security.55 However, the Palme Report also 
advocated a wider notion of security, arguing that security could not be 
achieved by military means alone.56 Yet, on its priority list of how to reach the 
new “common security”, economic issues were only ranked at the sixth and last 
spot.57 
By contrast, the Brandt Commission had set itself the broader task of “secur-
ing survival” and, accordingly, laid much greater emphasis on the importance 
of addressing economic and especially energy questions in order to overcome 
the contemporary worldwide dangers and security risks. The focus on energy as 
the crucial factor for the global security situation is not surprising if we look at 
the biographies of the members of the Brandt Commission, which first met in 
1977. Several of them had held high government positions during the first oil 
crisis and had thus experienced how disruptive an imagined or real shortage of 
oil could be to both economic life and international relations: Willy Brandt 
himself had been Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Edward 
Heath the British Prime Minister, Haruki Mori the Japanese ambassador in 
London, Olof Palme the Swedish Prime Minister, Layachi Yaker the Algerian 
minister of trade and Jan P. Pronk the Dutch minister for developmental coop-
eration. On the basis of their first-hand experience of the oil crisis, they argued 
that the world economy was in severe danger because of the huge differences 
in wealth between the North and the South. If nothing changed and develop-
ments simply continued, they envisioned ecological disasters, hunger and pov-
erty in the developing world, inflation and high deficits in the industrialized. 
Considering the exceptional position of oil in the international economy and its 
use by OPEC in order to voice Third World demands, they saw energy as the 
decisive issue that had to be addressed in an “Emergency Programme” in order 
to “secure survival”.58 While secure oil supply at a reasonable price concerned 
the standard of living in industrialized countries, it affected the basic life 
chances of people in the least developed countries. The “Emergency Pro-
gramme” therefore recommended that oil-producing countries should pledge 
not to decrease or interrupt supplies, oil-consuming countries should reduce 
demand, oil prices should be fixed at a fair level, and the international commu-
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nity should invest in collaborative research and development of alternative 
energies.59 
With its goals to secure survival and distribute life chances more equally or 
at least to secure basic necessities of human life for everybody on this planet, 
the Brandt Report already resembled later visions of human security which 
were formulated in the 1990s. The central trigger for the formulation of the 
report, however, was the changing energy scene of the 1970s and its conse-
quences for both the security of living conditions in Western industrialized 
countries and the lives of people in least developed countries which might be 
threatened by lack of resources, future resource wars or even the ecological 
consequences of the burning of fossil fuels. Ecological problems and the threat 
they posed to worldwide survival but also to economic well-being and security 
were the main issues of the “World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment”, which was headed by the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, who had also been a member of the Brandt and the Palme 
Commissions. The report argued that the traditional concept of security which 
concerned political and military threats to national sovereignty had to be ex-
tended because of the increasing influence of environmental pollution on a 
local, national, regional and global level.60 In this respect, energy, understood 
not as a single product but as a combination of products and services, was 
essential: On energy, the report maintained, depended the well-being of the 
individual, the sustainable development of the nations, and the life-sustaining 
capacities of the world ecosystem.61 With the upheavals of the oil economy in 
mind, the report argued that oil was crucial in the field of energy.  
4. Conclusion: Energy Security as Human Security? 
This article pursued the twofold goal of examining, on the one hand, the 
changes in the concept of energy security in the second half of the twentieth 
century and, on the other hand, the influence of these conceptual changes on 
the overall change to “security”. Following Emma Rothschild’s and Christo-
pher Daase’s theses that the concept of security was significantly extended in 
the postwar world, that this extension accelerated in the 1970s, and engendered 
current conceptions of human security, I showed how the scope of “energy 
security” increased in a similar fashion. As oil became increasingly important 
for modern industrialized economies in the postwar world, more and more 
often discourses on “energy security” did not treat oil as a strategic resource 
necessary to fuel the war effort, but rather as the foundation of economic, so-
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cial, and political life in Western industrialized countries. Owing to its vital 
importance for a wide variety of economic processes, even short supply disrup-
tions or minor price increases posed threats to economic development, to the 
social cohesion of consensual democracies, the stability of political institutions, 
and thus to national security. In drastic depictions of the consequences of a loss 
of oil supplies for the industrialized, but especially for the developing coun-
tries, as well as in the debates concerning the destabilizing effects that the 
world energy economy might have on the international system and the increas-
ing risk of military confrontations, discourses on energy security anticipated 
later discourses on human security. 
This resemblance is not coincidental, as the flourishing debates on energy 
security in the 1970s directly influenced the extension of the concept of secu-
rity in the postwar world from state-centered military to human security. The 
challenge of energy security during the oil crises of the 1970s opened the secu-
rity debates up to the appreciation of new risks, their global nature, and thus 
also the relevance of international cooperation, the importance of non-state 
actors, and the acknowledgment of individual people whose livelihood was to 
be secured. The Brandt Report in particular focused on energy, as it aimed at 
securing survival on the planet by bringing about a fairer world order. Against 
the backdrop of the 1970s oil crises, high government officials, who had ex-
perienced the economic and political upheavals a lack of oil supplies or even 
rising oil prices could cause, judged that energy was the crucial issue that had 
to be addressed in order to achieve ecological, economic, social, and political 
stability. In its broadened conception of security the Brandt Report already 
resembled later UN reports on Human Security. From the point of view of the 
twenty-first century’s discussions on climate change and resource wars, its 
diagnoses and recommendations appear to be surprisingly up-to-date. However, 
it would be exaggerated to describe the Commission as prescient. Rather, the 
changes in the energy and particularly oil economy in the 1970s had cut 
through the traditional Cold War structure of threats and security, which was 
ultimately abolished in the years around 1990. The oil crises of the 1970s 
thereby created a situation in which several of the most fundamental political, 
economic, and cultural problems emerged which continue to occupy us today, 
so that they appear as an important watershed in the history of Western indus-
trial nations. 
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